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Justice Tobriner's Tort Decisions:
A Reaffirmation of the Common Law Process
By ELIS J. Ho~vrrz*
In recent years the California Supreme Court has pioneered in
the adaptation of tort law to modem needs. As a frequent spokesman
for the court, Justice Tobriner has been a leader in this development.
Tort law, more than most other fields of law, is a creation of the
common law. It is primarily judge-made law rather than statutory
law. In Justice Tobriner's view, the common law is an ongoing process
that involves the modification of old rules and the creation of new ones
to reflect changing community values as well as to protect traditional
values in the face of changing social and economic conditions. He
has observed, "The economic tensions of the society press upon the
legal status quo. Inevitably the stress and strain works changes: the
doctrinal innovations do not rise phoenix-like from the ashes of their
predecessors, but rather stem from society's demands and changes."'
Justice Tobriner has articulated the societal needs and public
policy goals he has sought to implement in tort law through his judicial
opinions and other published writings. He has repeatedly formulated
rules designed to protect the rights and well-being of individuals within society, a society that is "rapidly becoming more complex and col*
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1. Tobriner, Retrospect: Ten Years on the California Supreme Court, 20 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 5, 12 (1972). Professor Llewellyn has described the reverse side of the same
coin: "I know of no phase of our law so misunderstood as our system of precedent.
The basic false conception is that a precedent or the precedents will in fact .
simply
dictate the decision in the current case ....
Now the truth is this: only in times of stagnation or decay does an appellate system even faintly resemble such a picture of detailed dictation by the precedents, and
even in times of stagnation ... movement and change still creep up on the blind side
of the stagnators." K. LLEwELLYN, THE COmmoN LAw TRArrmoN: DECmINc ArPrLs 62-63 (1960).
Justice Holmes said it more succinctly: "To rest upon a formula
is a slumber that, prolonged, means death." 0. W. HoLmES, Ideals and Doubts, in
CoLLE
LEGAL PAPEns 306 (1920).
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lectivized" 2 and more "risk-infested." 3 Justice Tobriner observed that
"[o]ur current crowded and computerized society compels the interdependence of its members,"' 4 and forces individuals necessarily to
rely upon public institutions both to perform their basic functions
and to protect them from injury. 5 Individuals are, therefore, less
able to control their immediate environments or to participate in the
principal decisions affecting their lives.
Justice Tobriner's writings reflect the influence of earlier jurists,
particularly Justice Brandeis. Justice Brandeis' central concern, articulated by Learned Hand a generation ago, contained the seeds of
Justice Tobriner's legal philosophy today: "Among multitudes relations must become standardized; to standardize is to generalize, and
to generalize is to ignore all those authentic features which mark, and
which indeed alone create, an individual."6
From this perspective, Justice Tobriner has ovet the past fifteen
years been a principal architect in the formulation of significant new
developments in the field of tort law. This Article will focus on
Justice Tobriner's contributions to two of those developments. First,
decisions by the California Supreme Court reflect reduced emphasis
on the nature of the defendant's conduct and greater sensitivity to the
character of the plaintiff's injury. Second, the court has given increased attention to the status of the parties and the relationship between them. No longer is the principal issue whether the defendant
engaged in wrongful conduct but rather which party by reason of
status and position is best able (a) to prevent the injury regardless
of fault, (b) to absorb the loss, and (c) to carry the burden of
explaining how the injury occurred.
In the course of this change the California Supreme Court and
other courts have redefined and expanded the concept of duty, reflecting judicial sensitivity to the nature of the plaintiff's injury and
the enhanced importance of the parties' status and position.
2. Tobriner, Lawyers, Judges and Watergate, 49 CAL. ST. B.J. 111, 182 (1974).
See also Tobriner, Retrospect: Ten Years on the California Supreme Court, 20 U.C.L.A.

L.

REV.

5 (1972).

3.

Tobriner, The Changing Concept of Duty in the Law of Torts, 9 CAL. TRIAL
LAw. J. 17 (1970); Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 442, 551
P.2d 334, 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 27 (1976).
4. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 442, 551 P.2d 334, 347,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 27 (1976).
5. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 280, 419 P.2d 168, 179, 54 Cal. Rptr.
104, 115 (1966) (a contract case).

6.

L. Hand, Mr. Justice Brandeis, in

THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY

159-60 (1952).
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Dillon v. Legg: Recognition Of The Plaintiffs Injury
Dillon v. Legg7 exemplifies the California Supreme Court's new
emphasis on the character of the tort injury in each case. Mrs. Dillon
suffered emotional shock and physical injury when she watched the
defendant driver negligently strike and kill her infant child with his
car. Because Mrs. Dillon was outside the zone of danger 8 when she
witnessed the accident, the trial court entered judgment on the pleadings for the defendant based on the authority of Amaya v. Home Ice,
Fuel & Supply Co.9 The supreme court reversed.
If limited to its facts, Dillon is not a significant case. Justice
Tobriner acknowledged that "here we deal with a comparatively isolated and unusual situation." 10 Nevertheless, Dillon is truly a landmark case. Five years before, the California Supreme Court had
reached the opposite conclusion in Amaya. The majority in Amaya
expressed overriding concern that a inle creating a cause of action
in favor of a mother who was outside the zone of danger would have
no logical stopping point and would if recognized have "thrown [us]
back into the fantastic realm of infinite liability.""
In Dillon, the court reexamined the fears that the court in Amaya
has expressed, reversed its prior holding, and gave redress to the
mother's injury.' 2 From the opening line of his opinion, Justice Tobriner stressed the nature of the plaintiff's injury:
That the court should allow recovery to a mother who suffers
emotional trauma and physical injury for witnessing the infliction
of death or injury to her child for which the tortfeasor is liable
in negligence would appear to be a compelling proposition.

As

Prosser points out, "All ordinary human feelings are in favor of
her [the mother's] action against the negligent defendant. . .
7. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
8. Pretrial depositions indicated that the deceased infant's sister, also a plaintiff
in this case, was possibly standing on the curb such that she may have been in the
zone of danger. The trial court denied a motion for judgment on the pleadings with
respect to her allegation that she sustained emotional disturbance, shock, and injury
to her nervous system after seeing the defendant strike her sister. Justice Tobriner
commented: "In the first place, we can hardly justify relief to the sister for trauma
which she suffered upon apprehension of the child's death and yet deny it to the
mother merely because of a happenstance that the sister was some few yards closer
to the accident." Id. at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
9. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
10. 68 Cal. 2d at 743, 441 P.2d at 922, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 82.
11. Id. at 315, 379 P.2d at 525, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
12. 59 Cal. 2d at 295, 379 P.2d at 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
13. 68 Cal. 2d at 730, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
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He observed that none of the feared dangers expressed in Amaya and
past American decisions" "excuses the frustration of the natural justice
upon which the mother's claim rests." 15
The remainder of the opinion painstakingly analyzes the history
of the concept of duty in the common law. Feudal society imposed
liability on an actor regardless of fault or duty since "the defendant
[in feudal society] owed a duty to all the world to conduct himself
without causing injury to his fellows."16 In the nineteenth century,
the concept of duty developed into a "legal device . . .designed to
curtail the feared propensities of juries toward liberal awards."17 The
opinion explained that this development was a result of
[t]he Industrial Revolution, which cracked the solidity of the
feudal society and opened up wide and new areas of expansion
... . In the place of strict liability it introduced the theory
that an action for negligence would lie only if the defendant
breached a duty which he owed to plaintiff.18

Following this historical review, Justice Tobriner said that the
issue of liability
should be solved by the application of the principles of tort, not
by the creation of exceptions to them. Legal history shows that
artificial islands of exceptions, created from the fear that the legal process will not work, usually do not withstand the waves of
reality and, in time, descend into oblivion. 8
Dillon v. Legg represents a turning point in two significant respects. It marks the ascendancy of the court's recognition of the
rights of the injured plaintiff as a major element in determining the
scope of the defendant's liability. The plaintiff's reasonable expectations and need for personal security prevailed over the limiting and
immunizing concept of "duty," which found its justification in the
needs of an earlier industrial era.
14. "[Tlhey state . . .the imposition of duty [upon the tortfeasor to the mother]
would work disaster because it would invite fraudulent claims and it would invoke
courts in the hopeless task of defining the extent of the tortfeasor's liability." 68 Cal.
2d at 730, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
15. Id. at 731, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
16. 68 Cal. 2d at 734-35, 441 P.2d at 916-17, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76-77.
17. Id. at 734, 441 P.2d at 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76 (citation omitted) (quoting
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 332-33 (3d ed. 1964)). Justice Tobriner further quoted,
" 'It must not be forgotten that "duty" got into our law for the very purpose of combatting what was then feared to be a dangerous delusion ...that the law might countenance legal redress for all foreseeable harm.'" (quoting J. FLEMING, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS

47 (1967)).

18.

Id. at 735, 441 P.2d at 917, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77.

19.

Id. at 747, 441 P.2d at 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
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The second and perhaps the most significant aspect of Dillon lies
in the court's rejection of the fear of "the fantastic realm of infinite

liability" 20 as an insurmountable obstacle to the law-making function
of the judiciary.

Dillon exemplifies judicial recognition that compen-

sable loss must be redefined periodically by weighing considerations
of justice and of social and economic policy appropriate to the time
and place. Justice Tobriner noted that "[i]n future cases the courts
will draw lines of demarcation upon facts more subtle than the compelling ones alleged in the complaint before us." 21 In this manner

he has confirmed his confidence in the ongoing process of the common
22
law.
Tarasoff v. Regents and Barrera v. State Farm - Status:
The Defendant's Ability to Prevent Injury
Justice Tobriner's opinion in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University
of California23 offers a dramatic illustration of the importance of the
defendant's status, particularly his ability to prevent the injury, as a
factor in determining tort liability. Tarasoff is not without precedent;

it follows logically from earlier cases.
The facts are as follows. Prosenjit Poddar murdered Tatiana
Tarasoff.

Poddar previously had confided his intention to kill Tatiana

to a psychotherapist treating him at Cowell Memorial Hospital at
the University of California.
Tatiana's parents brought suit for wrongful death against the

psychotherapists and their employer, the Regents of the University
20. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 315, 379 P.2d 513,
525, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 45 (1963).
21. 68 Cal. 2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
22. In the nine years since Dillon was decided the fears expressed by the majority
in Amaya have not materialized. In Capelouto v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 7
Cal. 3d 889, 892 n.1, 500 P.2d 880, 882, 103 Cal. Rptr. 846, 858 (1972), and in
Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977), the
court held that Dillon does not give a cause of action to a claimant who, upon witnessing a third party negligently injure a family member, suffers only emotional distress unaccompanied by physical injury. More recently, Justice Tobriner, writing for
the majority, again limited the holding of Dillon in Borer v. American Airlines, 19 Cal.
3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977), and in Baxter v. Superior Court,
19 Cal. 3d 461, 563 P.2d 871, 138 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1977). Basing his decision on considerations of social and economic policy rather than on the mechanical application of
Dillon, Justice Tobriner for the court held in Borer that a child does not have a cause
of action for loss of parental companionship and consortium when the parent is negligently injured. Similarly, in Baxter, the court through Justice Tobriner held that the
parent is not entitled to such an action arising out of injury to the child.
23. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
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of California. The trial court sustained demurrers. The California
Supreme Court reversed.
The defendants asserted that they owed no duty of reasonable
care to Tatiana or to her parents. In rejecting this contention, Justice
Tobriner, relying on the court's earlier decision in Rowland v. Christian,24 invoked the duty of every person to use ordinary care. He
quoted the salient language of Rowland,25 which was adopted from
an early English case:
[W]henever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with regard to another . . . that if he did not use ordinary
care and skill in his own conduct . . . he would cause danger of
injury to the person or property of the other, a duty
arises to use
6
ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger."2

Justice Tobriner noted that the common law duty to use ordinary
care did not normally include a duty to control the conduct of others
nor to warn potential victims. Historically, common law judges were
reluctant to impose liability based upon an affirmative duty to act.
He explained, however, that there is an exception to this rule when
"the defendant stands in some special relationship to either the person
whose conduct needs to be controlled or . . . the foreseeable victim
27
of that conduct."
In analogous cases an affirmative duty to act has emerged from
the physician-patient relationship. Courts have held physicians liable
for negligent failure to protect third parties from patients' dangerous
propensities, including failure to isolate a patient with a contagious
disease or failure to warn a patient receiving medication not to drive
a car.2 8 By analogy he concluded that a psychotherapist in a special
relationship with a foreseeably dangerous person has a duty to attempt
to protect the potential victim. 29 Justice Tobriner quoted Fleming
and Maximov: "[T]he ultimate question of resolving the tension between the conflicting interests of patient and potential victim is one
80
of social policy, not professional expertise.."
Balancing society's interest in the victim's personal safety against
24. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
25. Id. at 112, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100 (quoting 11 Q.B.D. 503,
509 (1883) (Brett, J.)).
26. 17 Cal. 3d at 434, 551 P.2d at 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
27. Id. at 435, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
28. 17 Cal. 3d at 436-37, 551 P.2d at 342-44, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 22-24.
29. Id. at 439, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
30. Fleming and Maximov, The Patient or His Victim: the Therapist's Dilemma,
62 CALIF. L. REv. 1025, 1067 (1974).
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the interest of fostering effective treatment through the confidential
communication of therapist and patient, the court found the interest
in personal safety paramount. It stated, "The protective privilege
ends where the public peril begins." 31 Summarizing, Justice Tobriner
emphasized:
Our current crowded and computerized society compels the
interdependence of its members. In this risk-infested society we
can hardly tolerate the further exposure to danger that would result from a concealed knowledge of the therapist that his patient
was lethal.... [W]e see no sufficient societal interest that would
protect and justify concealment.
The containment of such risks
32
lies in the public interest

Tarasoff finds its origins in earlier decisions in which the defendant's status, his relationship to the injured person, and his ability to
avoid the injury were significant factors in determining the issue of
liability.33 One of these earlier cases is Barrerav. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.34 Barrera obtained judgment against State
Farm's insured for injury from an automobile accident. State Farm
attempted to avoid liability by rescinding its policy because of the
insured's misrepresentations in his original application for insurance.
Speaking for the court, Justice Tobriner rejected State Farm's defense
holding that the defendant was under a duty to the insured as well
as to the public "to conduct a reasonable investigation of insurability
within a reasonable time after issuance of an automobile liability
policy." 5 He noted that the "quasi-public nature of the insurance
business and the "public policy that protects an innocent victim of the
careless use of automobiles from an inability to sue a financially responsible defendant"1 were the two major reasons the court imposed
a duty to investigate. Such a duty is owed to members of the public who suffer injury at the hands of presumably insured motorists.
An insurance company, which takes the risk that its insured will be
involved in an accident causing injury, is in the best position to conduct an investigation of the representations of its insured. As in
Tarasoff, the defendant's status as the one best able to either prevent
31. 17 Cal. 3d at 442, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 436 nn.7 & 9, 551 P.2d at 343-44, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23-24.
34. 71 Cal. 2d 659, 456 P.2d 674, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1969). Justice Tobriner
dealt with the defendant's status and the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant in interpreting an insurance contract of adhesion in Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co.,
65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
35. 71 Cal. 2d at 668-69, 456 P.2d at 680-81, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 112-13.
36. Id. at 674-75, 456 P.2d at 685, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 117.
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the wrong or ameliorate the injury was an important factor in determining whether tort liability should attach.
Another example of Justice Tobriner's concept of relationship3
derived liability is Johnson v. State.In that case the Youth Authority
placed a teenager with homicidal tendencies in a foster home with
the plaintiff without warning the plaintiff of the youth's dangerous
propensities. The youth assaulted and injured the plaintiff. Justice
Tobriner said "As the party placing the youth with . . . [the plaintiff], the state's relationship to the plaintiff was such that its duty
extended to warning of latent, dangerous qualities suggested by
the parolee's history or character " 3 1 and summarily disposed of the
contention that the state owed no duty to the plaintiff.3 9
Finally, the defendant's status, particularly his superior position
to prevent injury or spread the risk, was a visible factor in imposing
tort liability in Vesely v. Sager.40 In the opinion by Chief Justice
Wright in which Justice Tobriner concurred, the supreme court held
that civil liability may be imposed upon a tavern keeper for providing
alcoholic beverages to an already intoxicated customer who thereafter
injures a third person. The court reevaluated and abandoned the
old common law doctrine that furnishing alcoholic beverages is not
the proximate cause of the third party's injuries and observed that the
issue was not one of proximate cause but rather one of duty. 41 A
tavern owner controls the liquor served on the premises and is, therefore, best able to judge whether to refuse to serve a customer because
that customer may become dangerous to others.
Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel - Status: The Defendant's
Superior Ability to Explain How Injury Occurred
Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel,42 further illustrates the significance of
the status and relationship of the parties, in this case to show who can
best bear the burden of explaining how the injury occurred. The facts
are brief and tragic. Mr. and Mrs. Haft and their five-year-old son
37. 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968).
38. Id. at 758, 447 P.2d at 355, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
39. The court has also applied relationship-derived liability to commercial injury. See Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d
609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968).
Liability based on status also has found expression
in products liability cases. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d
57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
40. 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
41. Id. at 163-64, 486 P.2d at 158-59, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 630-31. See generally
Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976).
42. 3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970).
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were vacationing at the defendants' hotel. While Mrs. Haft was away
shopping, both her husband and child drowned in the swimming pool
furnished by defendant for use by its guests. Defendants failed to
provide any major safety measures required by law, including a lifeguard or substitute sign advising guests that no lifeguard was present.
The court observed, "It would be difficult to find a pool that was more
dangerous than the attractive facility which the Lone Palm offered its
guests . .

."4

Despite overwhelming evidence that the defendants had breached
their duty, Mrs. Hafts wrongful death claim foundered on the doctrine
of proximate cause. Accordingly, the lower court entered judgment
for the defendants. Reversing and remanding, Justice Tobriner noted
that there was a complete absence of evidence to explain exactly how
the decedents drowned and that "the evidentiary void in the . . .
action result[ed] primarily from the defendants' failure to provide a
lifeguard to observe occurrences within the pool area."" He continued:
The absence of such a lifeguard in the instant case thus not
only stripped decedents of a significant degree of protection to
which they were entitled, but also deprived the present plaintiffs of a means of definitively establishing the facts leading to the
drownings.
[P]laintiffs have gone as far as they possibly can under the
circumstances in proving the requisite causal link between defendaits' negligence and the accidents. To require plaintiffs to
establish "proximate causation" to a greater certainty than they
have in the instant case, would permit defendants to gain the advantage of the lack of proof
4 inherent in the lifeguardless situation
which they have created. 5
Justice Tobriner for the court concluded that the burden shifted
to the defendants to prove that their negligence was not the proximate
cause of the drownings. The opinion reemphasized the defendants'
statutory violation, their creation of a dangerous condition, and, most
important, their control over and familiarity with the premises. This
last factor was the basis upon which the court held that the status of
the defendants gave them superior ability to explain how the injury
occurred.
The rationale in Haft v. Lone Palm finds its origins in earlier
cases, such as Ybarra v. Spangard,4 6 a medical malpractice case in
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 763, 478 P.2d at 468, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 748.
Id. at 771, 478 P.2d at 474, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 754.
Id. at 771-72, 478 P.2d at 474-75, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 754-55.
25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
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which the supreme court invoked the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to
shift the burden of explanation for the plaintiff's injury to the defendant
doctors and hospital personnel. In Ybarra the supreme court observed
that, without the benefit of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the court
would be forced to invoke the principle of absolute liability in order
47
to avoid gross injustice.
In the years since Ybarra v. Spangard, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur has been used with regularity in medical malpractice cases,
particularly in cases in which unexplained injury has occurred on the
operating table. Recognizing the limitations of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, Justice Tobriner in Clark v. Gibbons48 wrote a concurring
opinion in which he suggested that, when an inexplicable accident
occurs in the operating room as in Ybarra, the court should abandon
the concept of negligence and "the largely fictitious and often futile
search for fault which presently characterizes medical injury litigation"
and substitute a doctrine of strict liability.4 9 Recognizing the catastrophic effect which a malpractice judgment can have upon a doctor's
career and possibly anticipating the present medical malpractice litigation crisis, he observed that a rule of strict liability (1) "can insure
that the burdens of unexplained accidents will not fall primarily upon
the helpless but will be borne instead by those best able to spread
their cost among all who benefit from the surgical operations in which
these misfortunes occur," 50 (2) will permit "a far higher percentage
of all medical controversies [to be] settled out of court, without the
'economic and emotional strain of protracted litigation requiring difficult or impossible proof," ' 51 and (3) will "not impose the stigma
of negligence upon a doctor merely because an operation yields an
uncommon and inexplicable result . . . [which] may well bear no
relationship to negligence." 5 2 This concurring opinion further exemplifies Justice Tobriner's emphasis on the superior status of the defendants not only to prevent injury but to explain how it occurred.
By the same token, easing the burden of the plaintiff's proof was
a motivating factor in the development of the law of products liabil47. Id. at 490-91, 154 P.2d at 689.
48. 66 Cal. 2d 399, 426 P.2d 525, 58 Cal. Rptr. 125 (1967).
49. Id. at 417, 426 P.2d at 538, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
50. Id. at 419, 426 P.2d at 539, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 139 (footnote omitted).
51. Id. at 421, 426 P.2d at 540, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 140, (quoting Ehrenzweig, Compulsory "Hospital-Accident" Insurance, A Needed First Step Toward the Displacement
of Liability for "Medical Malpractice," 31 U. Cm. L. Rv. 279, 288 (1964)).
52. Id. at 421, 426 P.2d at 540, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
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ity. In Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,53 the California Supreme Court
eliminated the requirement that the plaintiff prove that the manufacturer's defect made the product unreasonably dangerous, explaining
that this requirement "has burdened the injured plaintiff with proof
of an element which rings of negligence." 54 Justice Sullivan, writing
for the court, reaffirmed that the very purpose of instituting the doctrine of strict products liability "was to relieve the plaintiff from problems of proof. . ."5 which he faced when trying to prove negligence
or breach of warranty.
Conclusion
It is a commonplace observation that the increasing tempo with
which change occurs is one of the principal characteristics of contemporary society. This change pervades virtually all aspects of our
lives. The California Supreme Court, often with Justice Tobriner as
its spokesman, has recognized and given expression to these changes
in the field of tort law. This recognition is consistent with the evolutionary process of the common law. Justice Tobriner's opinions
reflect this process at work in what Professor Llewellyn has described
as the Grand Style of Reason. 56 His opinions disclose a deep respect
for precedent and recognition of the need for continuity. 57 Nonetheless, he agrees with Justice Holmes that "the present has a right to
govern itself so far as it can; ... historic continuity with the past is
not a duty, it is only a necessity."58 He has therefore recognized the
need for change and choice and has sought to frame new rules appropriate to our times and circumstances. He has observed, "The common law is no more than an ongoing manuscript of mankind's long,
struggling march. The law's genius lies in its creative continuity."59
As he has built upon earlier legal concepts and developed them into
decisional law, so has he opened new areas of inquiry which, like
fine wine, will require years to develop into mature doctrine. Above
all, by his example he teaches that critical reevaluation is continually
necessary to the health and growth of the law.
8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
Id. at 132, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
Id. at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
Id.
57. K. LLEwELLYN, THE CoMMoen LAw TRAITION: DEcIDING APPEALS, 402 n.1
(1960).
58. 0. W. HOLMES, Learning and Science, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 139
(1920).
59. Tobriner, The Changing Concept of Duty in the Law of Torts, 9 CAL. TwAL
LAw. J. 17, 23 (1970).
53.
54.
55.
56.

